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ABSTRACT We use the Minority Game and some of its variants to show
how efficiency depends on learning in models of agents competing for lim-
ited resources. Exact results from statistical physics give a clear under-
standing of the phenomenology, and opens the way to the study of reverse
problems. What agents can optimize and how well is discussed in details.
Designed a simplification of Arthur’s El Farol bar problem [1], the Mi-
nority Game [2, 3] provides a natural framework for studying how selfish
adaptive agents can cope with competition. The major contribution of the
Minority Game is not only to symmetrize the problem, which physicists like
very much, but also to introduce a well parametrized set of strategies, and
more generally to provide a well defined and workable family of models.
In this game, N agents have to choose one between two choices at each
time step; those who are in the minority win, the other lose. Obviously, it is
easier to loose than to win, as the number of winners cannot exceed that of
the losers. If the game is played once, only a random choice is reasonable,
according to Game Theory [4]. When the game is repeated, it is sensible to
suppose that agents will try to learn from the past in order to outperform
the other agents, hence, the question of learning arises, as the minority
mechanism entails a never-ending competition.
Let me first introduce the game and the needed formalism. There are N
agents, agent i taking action ai ∈ {−1,+1}. A game master aggregates the
individual actions into A =
∑N
i=1 ai and gives private payoffs −aig(A) to
each agent i = 1, · · · , N . The minority structure of the game implies that
g must be an odd function of A. The simplest choice for g may seem to
be g(A) = sgn (A), but a linear function is better suited to mathematical
analysis. The MG is a negative sum game, as the total payoff given to
the agents, is −∑Ni=1 aig(A) = −g(A)A < 0, since g is an odd function. In
particular, the linear payoff function gives a total loss of A2; when the game
is repeated, the average total loss is nothing else than the fluctuations of
1
2the attendance σ2 = 〈A2〉 where the average is over time.
From the point of view of the agents, it is a measure of payoff wastage.
That is why many papers on the MG consider it as the global utility of the
system (world utility hereafter), and try, of course to minimize it (forward
problem). I shall review the quest for small σ2, focusing on exact results,
and show that all proposed mechanisms lead essentially to the same re-
sults.1 A particular emphasis will be put on inductive behavior, as it gives
rise to particularly rich phenomenology while being well understood. Fi-
nally, the reverse problem is addressed, by deriving what private payoff
function g to use given a world utility W to minimize.
1 No public information
1.1 “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”
The arguably simplest behavior is the following [8]: if agent i wins at time
t, she sticks to her choice ai(t) until she looses, when she takes the opposite
choice with probability p. The dynamics is Markovian, thus can be solved
exactly [8]. When N is large, the fluctuations σ2 are of order (pN)2: indeed,
as the number of losers is ∼ N , the average number of agents changing their
minds at time t is ∼ pN . Therefore, one can distinguish three regimes
• pN = x = cst; this leads to small fluctuations σ2 = 1 + 4x(1 + x/3),
which tend to the absolute minimum σ2 = 1 when x → 0. The time
needed to reach the stationary state is typically of order
√
N .
• p ∼ 1/
√
N ; this yields σ2 ∼ N , which is the order of magnitude of
produced by agents making independent choices.
• pN ≫ 1. In this case, a finite fraction of agents change their mind at
each time step and σ2 = N(Np2 + 4(1− p))/(2− p)2 ∼ N2.
The major problem here is that p needs to be tuned in order to reach
high efficiency. But it is very easy to design a feedback from the fluctuations
on p [9], that lowers p as long as the fluctuations are too high, and to
use the above results in order to relate the fluctuations to p(t → ∞).
Mathematically, this amounts to take p(t = 0) = 1, dp/dt = −f(p,N, t).
For instance, f(t) = t−β seems appropriate as long as β is small enough.
Note that p(t)→ 0 as t→∞, in words, the system eventually freezes. From
the optimization point of view, this is a welcome, but as for agents, complete
freezing, although being a Nash equilibrium [4], is not satisfactory. as it may
be better for an agent sitting on the losing side to provoke an game-quake
1Evolutionary models (see for instance [2, 5, 6, 7]) are very different in nature, and
are not reviewed here, mostly because they are not exactly solvable.
3and to profit from a re-arrangement of the winners/losers. Therefore, an
unanswered question is where to stop the time evolution of p.
Nevertheless, this simple example illustrates well what happens in MGs:
the efficiency essentially depends on the opinion switching rate, which itself
depends on the learning rate. It has to be small in order to reach good level
of efficiency.
1.2 Inductive behavior
Inductive behavior can remedy the problems of the previous learning scheme
if, as we shall see, agents know the nature of the game that they are playing.
This subsection is a simplified version of the simplest setting for inductive
agents of ref. [10]. At time t, each agent i = 1, · · · , N plays +1 with proba-
bility πi(t), and −1 with probability 1−πi(t). Learning consists in changing
πi given the outcome of the game at time t. For this purpose, each agent i
has a numerical register ∆i(t) which reflects her perception at time t of the
relative success of action +1 versus action −1. In other words, ∆i(t) > 0
means that she believes that action +1 has been more successful than −1.
The idea is the following: if agent i observes A(t) < 0 she will increase ∆i
and hence her probability of playing ai = +1 at the next time step. Rein-
forcement here means that πi is an increasing function of ∆i. For reasons
that will become obvious later, it is advisable to take πi = (1 +mi)/2 and
mi = χ(∆i)/2, where χ is an increasing function and χ(±∞) = ±1. The
way in which ∆i(t) is updated is the last and most crucial element of the
learning dynamics to be specified:
∆i(t+ 1) = ∆i(t)− 1
N
[A(t)− ηai(t)]. (1)
The η term above describe the fact that agent i may account for her own
contribution to A(t). When η = 0, she believes that A(t) is an external
process on which she has no influence, or does not know what kind of
game she is playing. She may be called naive with this respect. For η = 1,
agent i considers only the behavior of other agents A−i(t) = A(t) − ai(t)
and does not react to her own action ai(t). As we shall see, this subtlety
is the key to high efficiency. The private utility of sophisticated agents
corresponds more or less to what is called Aristocrat Utility (AU) in COIN’s
nomenclature [11].
Naive agents η = 0
It is possible to show that agents minimize the predictability H = 〈A〉2. As
a consequence H vanishes in the t → ∞ limit. There are of course many
states with H = 0 and the dynamics selects that which is the “closest” to
the initial condition. To be more precise, let ∆i(0) be the initial condition
(which encodes the a priori beliefs of agent i on which action is the best
4one). As t→∞, 〈A〉t =
∑
imi(t)→ 0 and ∆i converges to
∆i(∞) = ∆i(0) + δA, with δA =
∫ ∞
0
dt〈A〉t. (2)
The condition 〈A〉∞ = 0 provides an equation for δA
0 =
N∑
i=1
χ (∆i(0) + δA) . (3)
By the monotonicity property of χ, this equation has one and only one
solution.
The asymptotic state of this dynamics is information–efficient (H = 0),
but it is not optimal, as, in general, this state is not a Nash equilibrium. The
fluctuations are indeed determined by the behavior of χ(x). This is best
seen with a particular example: assume that the agents behave according
to a Logit model of discrete choice [12] where the probability of choice a
is proportional to the exponential of the “score” Ua of that choice: π(a) ∝
eΓUa/2. With only two choices a = ±1, π(a) = (1+am)/2 and ∆ = U+−U−,
we obtain 2
χ(∆) = tanh(Γ∆), ∀i. (4)
Here Γ is the learning rate, which measures the scale of the reaction in
agent’s behavior (i.e. in mi) to a change in ∆i [14]. We also assume that
agents have no prior beliefs: ∆i(0) = 0. Hence ∆i(t) ≡ y(t)/Γ is the same
for all agents. From the results discussed above, we expect, in this case the
system to converge to the symmetric Nash equilibrium mi = 0 for all i.
This is not going to be true if agents are too reactive, i.e. if Γ > Γc. Indeed,
y(t) = Γ∆i(t) satisfies the equation
y(t+ 1) = y(t)− Γ
N
N∑
i=1
ai(t)
≃ y(t)− Γ tanh[y(t)] (5)
where the approximation in the last equation relies on the law of large
numbers for N ≫ 1. Eq. (5) is a dynamical system. The point y0 = 0 is
stationary, but it is easy to see that it is only stable for Γ < Γc = 2. For
Γ > 2, a cycle of period 2 arises, as shown in Fig. 1. This has dramatic
effects on the optimality of the system. Indeed, let ±y∗ be the two values
taken by y(t) in this cycle3. Since y(t + 1) = −y(t) = ±y∗ we still have
〈A〉 = 0 and hence H = 0. On the other hand σ2 = N2y∗2 is of order N2,
which is even worse than the symmetric Nash equilibrium πi = 1/2 for all
i, where σ2 = N .
2This learning model has been introduced by [13] in the context of the MG.
3
±y
∗ are the two non-zero solutions of 2y = Γ tanh(y).
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FIGURE 1. Graphical iteration of the map y(t) for Γ = 1.8 < Γc and Γ = 2.5 > Γc
Hence, one finds again a transition from σ2 ∝ N to σ2 ∝ N2 when the
learning rate is too large.
Sophisticated agents η > 0
It is easy to check that with η > 0, following the same steps as in the
previous section, the learning dynamics of agents minimize the function
Hη = 〈A〉2 − η
N∑
i=1
m2i , (6)
Since Hη is a harmonic function, Hη attains its minima on the boundary
of the domain [−1, 1]N . In other words, mi = ±1 for all i which means that
agents play pure strategies ai = mi. The stable states are optimal Nash
equilibria forN even. By playing pure strategies agents minimize the second
term of Hη. Of all corner states where m
2
i = 1 for all i, agents select those
with 〈A〉 = 0 by dividing into two equal groups playing opposite actions.
All these states have minimal “energy” Hη = −Nη. Which of these states
is selected depends on the initial conditions ∆i(0), but this has no influence
on the outcome, since 〈A〉 = 0.
Note that the set of stable states is disconnected. Each state has its basin
of attraction in the space of ∆i(0). The stable state changes discontinuously
as ∆i(0) is varied. This contrasts with the case η = 0 where Eq. (3) implies
that the stationary state changes continuously with ∆i(0) and the set of
stationary states is connected.
6For N odd, similar conclusions can be found. This can be understood
by adding a further agent to a state with N − 1 (even) agents in a Nash
equilibrium. Then Hη = (1− η)m2N , so for η < 1 the new agent will play a
mixed strategy mi = 0, whereas for η > 1 it will play a pure strategy. In
both cases other agents have no incentive to change their position. In this
case we find σ2 ≤ 1.
It is remarkable how the addition of the parameter η radically changes
the nature of the stationary state. Most strikingly, fluctuations are reduced
by a factor N . From a design point of view, this means that one has either
to give a personalized feedback to autonomous agents, or to make them
more sophisticated, for instance because they need to know the functional
form of the payoff.
2 Public information
As each agent has an influence on the outcome of the game, the behavior
of particular agent may introduce patterns that the other agents will try
to exploit. For instance, if only one agent begins to think that the outcome
of next game depends on some external state, such as the present weather
of Oxford, and behave accordingly, then indeed, the outcome will depend
on it.4 But this means that other agents can exploit this new pattern by
behaving conditionally on the same state. One example of public informa-
tion state family that agents may consider as relevant is the past winning
choices, for instance a window of size M of past outcomes [2]. Each such
state can be represented by a bit-string of size M , hence there are 2M
possible states of the world. This kind of state has a dynamics of its own:
it diffuses on a so called De Bruijn Graph [15]. Another state dynamics
consists simply in drawing at random the state at time t from some ensem-
ble [16] of size P (e.g. P = 2M ). All exact results below are obtained with
this setup.
2.1 Neural Networks
Two types of neural networks have been studied in the context of the MG
[17, 18, 19]. Beyond the mere academic question of how well or badly they
can perform, it is worth noting that these papers were interested for the
first time in interacting neural networks.
Refs [17, 18] introduced simple perceptrons playing the minority game.
Each perceptron i = 1, · · · , N is made up of M weights ~wi = (w11 , · · · , wM1 )
which are drawn at random before the game begins. The decision of network
4This kind of self-fulfilled prophecy is found for instance in financial markets, where
it is called ‘sunspot effect’.
7i is ai = sgn (~w.~µ), where ~µ is the vector containing the M last minority
signs. The payoff was chosen to be −aisgn (A). Neural networks are trained
following the usual Hebbian rule, that is,
~wi(t+ 1) = ~wi(t)− η
M
~µtsgn (At). (7)
Under some simplifying assumptions, it is possible to find that the fluctu-
ations are given by [17, 18]
σ2 = N +N(N − 1)
(
1− 2
π
arccos
K − 1/(N − 1)
K + 1
)
(8)
where K = η
2pi
16
(
1 +
√
1 + 16(pi−2)η2piN
)
. The best efficiency, obtained in the
limit η → 0, is given by
σ2 = N
(
1− 2
π
)
. (9)
This means that the fluctuations are at best of order N , and at worst of
order N2 when the learning rate is too high. This is likely to be corrected
for neural networks with sophisticated private utility.
2.2 Inductive behavior
El Farol’s problem was introduced with public information and inductive
behavior [1], but with no precise characterization of the strategy space. In
most MG-inspired models, a strategy is a lookup table a, or a map, or a
function, which predicts the next outcome aµ for each state µ, and whose
entries are fixed for the whole duration of the game. Each agent i has a set
of S strategies, say S = 2 (ai,1 and ai,2), and use them essentially in the
same way as before [2].
Naive agents
To each of her strategies, agent i associate a score Ui,s which evolves ac-
cording to
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t)− aµ(t)i,s g[A(t)] (10)
Since we consider S = 2, only the difference between ∆i = Ui,2 − Ui,1
matters, and
∆i(t+ 1) = ∆i(t)− (aµ(t)i,2 − aµ(t)i,1 )g[A(t)] (11)
Note that now ∆i encodes the perception of the relative performance of
the two strategies of agent i, ∆i > 0 meaning that the agent i thinks that
strategy 2 is better than strategy 1, and mi is the frequency of use of
8strategy 2. As before, we consider χ(x) = tanh(Γx). This kind of agents
minimizes the predictability, which has now to be averaged over the public
information states
H =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
〈A|µ〉2 = 〈A〉2 (12)
where Q =
∑P
µ=1Q
µ is a useful shortcut for the average over the states of
the world. In contrast with the case with no information, H is not always
canceled by the agents. This is due to the fact that the agents are faced to
P possible states, but their control over their behavior is limited: when they
switch from one strategy to another, they change their behavior potentially
for all states. In fact all macroscopic quantities such as H/N and σ2/N
depend of the ratio α = P/N [20, 21, 22], which is therefore the control
parameter of the system. Solving this model is much more complex and
requires tools of Statistical Physics of disordered systems [23]. The resulting
picture is that for infinite system size (P , N →∞ with P/N = α = cst) [22]
(see also Fig 2),
• H > 0 if α = N/P > αc = 0.3374 . . .. In this region, the system
is not informationally efficient. It tends to a stationary state which
is unique and stable, and does not depend either on Γ or on initial
conditions. Γ is a time scale [14].
• H = 0 when α < αc. Since agents succeed in minimizing H , the ques-
tion for them is what should they do? They do not known, and as
a result, the dynamics of the system is very complex: it depends on
initial conditions5 [10, 24, 26, 25], and on Γ [13, 26, 25]. Any value of
the fluctuations can be obtained, from σ2 = 1 for very heterogeneous
initial conditions ∆i(t = 0) to σ
2 ∼ N2 for Γ = ∞ and homoge-
neous initial conditions, including σ2 ∼ N for Γ = 0 and any initial
conditions. Two alternative theories have been proposed, one which
is exact, but which has to be iterated [25], and another one which
rests on a closed form for the fluctuations [26]. Iterating the exact
theory is hard, since the t−th iteration is obtained by inverting t× t
matrices, and one has to average of several realizations. Nevertheless,
a hundred numerical iterations bring promising results [27].
The origin of the phase transition can easily be understood in terms of
linear algebra: canceling H = 0 means that 〈A|µ〉 = 0 for all µ. This is
nothing else than a set of P linear equations of N variables {mi}. As the
variables are bounded (0 ≤ m2i ≤ 1), one needs more that P of them,
N = P/αc > P to be precise [28].
In fact, the transition from low to high (anomalous) fluctuations does
not occur at αc for finite system size as it clearly appears on Fig 2. This
5Physicists say that it is not ergodic
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FIGURE 2. Fluctuations and predictability produced by naive agents P = 64,
300P iterations, average over 100 realizations. This kind of figure is first found
in ref. [20].
can be traced back to a signal to noise ratio transition [29]: the system is
dynamically stable in the phase of H > 0 as long as the signal to noise
ratio H/σ2 is larger than K/
√
P for some constant K. This transition
is universal for naive competing agents. Hence in this kind of interacting
agents systems, the ultimate cause of large fluctuations is this signal-to-
noise transition and high learning rate. Sophisticated agents are not affected
by this problem, as explained below.
Sophisticated agents
As before, a sophisticated agent is able to disentangle her own contribution
from g(A). Eq (10) becomes [22, 30]:
∆i(t+ 1) = ∆i(t)− (aµ(t)i,1 − aµ(t)i,2 )g(A(t)− ai(t)) (13)
When the payoff is linear g(A) = A, the agents also minimize the fluctu-
ations σ2 = 〈A2〉. Similarly, they end up using only one strategy, which
implies that H = σ2. In this case, they cannot cancel A for all µ at the
same time, hence σ2/N > 0. How to solve exactly this case is known in
principle [22, 30]. ’In principle’ here means that the minimization of σ2
is hard from an technical point of view; how much harder is also a ques-
tion hard to answer. A first step was done in ref. [31], which is able to
describe reasonably well the behavior of the system. Interestingly, in this
case the signal-to-noise ratio transition does not exist, as the signal is also
the noise (H = σ2), hence, there is no high volatility region (see Fig. 3).
10
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FIGURE 3. Fluctuations produced by sophisticated agents P = 64, NIT = 100P ,
average over 100 realizations.
Therefore, the fluctuations are again considerably reduced by introducing
sophisticated agents. An important point here is that the number of stable
final states {mi} [31] grows exponentially when N increases. Which one
is selected depends on the initial conditions, but the efficiency of the final
state greatly fluctuates. As the agents (and the programmer) have no clue
of which one to select, the system ends up having non-optimal fluctuations
of order N , as seen of Fig. 3.
3 Forward/reverse problems
Inductive agents minimize a world utility whose determination is the first
step in solving the forward problem. Finding analytically its minimum is
then possible in principle thanks to methods of Statistical Physics [23]. The
reverse problem consists in starting from a world utility W and finding the
appropriate private payoff.
3.1 Naive agents
The case with no information (P = 1) is trivial, since 〈A〉 = 0 in the
stationary state, hence all functions H2n = 〈A〉2n (n integer) are minimized
by a linear payoff. When the agents have access to public information (P >
1), the world utility W given any private payoff function g(A) is [26]
Wnaive({mi}) = 1
P
P∑
µ=1
∫ ∞
−∞
dx√
2π
e−x
2/2G
(
〈A|µ〉({mi}) + x
√
D
)
(14)
11
where g(x) = dG(x)/dx and D = σ2−H = (N−∑im2i )/2. In other words,
the agents select the set of strategy usage frequencies {mi} that minimizes
U . The final state is unique and does not depend on the initial conditions.
Note that in Eq (14), only powers of 〈A|µ〉 (µ = 1, · · · , P ) appear, which
means that naive agents are only able to minimize world utility that only
depend on these quantities. This implies that a phase transition always
happen if the agents are naive, and even more, that it always happen at
the same αc = 0.3374 . . ., as seen conjecture from numerical simulations
in [32]. As explained above, αc is the point where it is algebraically possible
to cancel all 〈A|µ〉 [28]. The above theory also means that the stationary
state depends only weakly on the payoff, which can be seen numerically by
comparing the mi of a given set of agents for different payoffs.
The reverse problem is now to find g given W . Let us focus on the
particular exampleW = 〈A〉2n, (n integer). First, one determines the world
utility W (2k) associated with g(x) = 2kx2k−1, where k is an integer,
W (2k) =
k∑
l=0
(
2k
2l
)
Dk−lX2(k−l)H2l, (15)
where Xl =
∫
exp(−x2/2)xl/√2π is the l-th moment of a Gaussian dis-
tribution of unitary variance and zero average, and H2l = 〈A〉2l is the
2l−norm of the vector (〈A|µ〉). Suppose now that one wishes to minimize
W = H2n. This can be done in principle with a linear combination of the
W (2k)
W = 〈A|µ〉2n =
n∑
k=0
akW
(2k) =
n∑
k=0
ak
k∑
l=0
(
2k
2l
)
Dk−lX2(k−l)H2l, (16)
The condition on the {ak} is that the coefficient of H2k be 0 for k =
0, · · · , n− 1, and the coefficient of H2n be 1, that is
n∑
m=k
am
(
2m
2k
)
Dm−kX2(m−k) = 0 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 (17)
and an = 1. Then the problem is solved by finding the solution of these n−1
linear equations of ak, k = 1, · · · , n− 1, and taking g(x) =
∑n
k=1 akx
2k−1.
Note that the set of the problems that naive agents can solve is of limited
practical interest.
3.2 Sophisticated agents
Sophisticated agents have instead
Wnaive({mi}) = 1
PN
P∑
µ=1
∫ ∞
−∞
dx√
2π
e−x
2/2
∑
i
G
(
〈Aµ−i({mi})〉+ x
√
D−i
)
(18)
12
where D−i = [(N − 1) −
∑
j 6=im
2
i ]/2. This case is much simpler than the
previous one, as all agents end up playing only one strategy [22], that is,
D−i = 0. Therefore, in this case, if g(A) = 2kA
2k+1,
W (2k) = 〈A2k〉. (19)
Interestingly, similar functions are well-studied in Statistical Physics,
where they usually represent the energy of interacting magnetic moments
called ”spins” [33]; a (classical) spin can have two values −1 or +1, which is
the equivalent of choosing strategy 1 or 2. A well-known qualitative change
occurs between k = 2 and k > 2, where the mathematical minimization of
W is somehow less problematic; this may also be the case in such MGs.
The final state is not unique, and depends on initial conditions, implying
that agents cannot are not particularly good at minimizing such functions.
3.3 Example: agent-based optimization
Some optimization problems are so hard to solve that they have a name:
they are hard, NP-hard [34]. There is no algorithm that can find the opti-
mum of this kind of problems in polynomial time. One of them consists in
finding amongst N either analogic or binary components the combination
that is the least defective [35]: in the problem with analogic components,
one has a set of N measuring devices; instead of A, each of them records
the wrong value A+ ai with a constant bias ai, i = 1, · · · , N , drawn from
a given probability function. The problem is to find a subset such that the
average bias
ǫ{ni} = |
∑N
i=1 niai|∑N
j=1 nj
(20)
is minimal. Here ni = 0, 1 depending on whether component i is included in
the subset. Statistical Physics shows that 〈ǫopt〉 ∼ C 2−N/
√
N for large N ,
with C ≃ 4.6 (the average is over the samples). In order to find the optimal
subset, one cannot do better than enumerating all the 2N possibilities. This
makes it hard to tackle such problems for N larger than 40 with nowadays
computers. Agent-based optimization on the other hand needs typically
O(N) iterations and can be used with much larger samples. It is clear that
one cannot expect this method to perform as well as the enumeration,
still how well it perform as a function of the setup is a valuable question.
Ref [37] compares a set of private payoffs and concludes that agent-based
optimization is better than simulated annealing for short times and large
samples, provided that the agents’ private utility is “aristocratic”.
Optimizing h = |∑Ni=1 niai| and then dividing by the number of com-
ponents used in the chosen subset leads to almost optimal subsets [35].
Hence, we can use sophisticated MG-agents in order to optimize h2 [38],
which plays the role of the fluctuations in the MG. The most straightfor-
ward application of the MG is to give two devices to each agents, which are
13
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FIGURE 4. Average error ǫ versus the size N of the defective component set for
MG with S = 2 (circles), and S = 1 (squares), S = 2 with removal (stars) and
S = 1 with removal (full squares. 500N iterations per run, averages over 1000
samples.
their strategies. Each agent ends up playing with only one strategy. This
setup constraints the use of N/2 devices in the optimal subset, and gives
an error of order N−1.5, to be compared with the exponential decay of the
optimal average error ǫopt. One can unconstrain the agents by giving only
one component to each agent, and letting them decide whether to include
their components or not into ǫ, making the game ’grand canonical’ [39, 40].
This is achieved by the following score evolution
Ui(t+ 1) = Ui(t)− ai[A− ni(t)ai] (21)
and ni(t) = Θ[Ui(t)]. The −niai term makes the agents sophisticated. This
gives similar results as those of ref [37], as indeed the Aristocrat Utility
is essentially the same concept as sophisticated agents. But in any case, it
minimizes the fluctuations, but does not optimize them. The resulting error
ǫ is much better with S = 1 than with S = 2: it decays ∼ N−2 (Fig 3.3).
Therefore, as in the optimal case, unconstraining the problem by not fixing
the number of selected components leads to much better efficiency.
At this stage, one can improve substantially the error, still remaining in
the O(N) complexity regime. First, since the agents update their behavior
simultaneously, they may be unable to distinguish whether removing only
one component improves the error. We can do it by hand at the end of the
simulations, repeatedly. This is a kind of greedy algorithm. On average,
about 1.5 components are removed. In both the S = 2 and S = 1 cases,
this results into a large improvement (see Fig. 3.3), and curioulsy produces
the same error, with a decay ∼ N−2.3. Nevertheless, the final error is still
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FIGURE 5. Average error ǫ versus the number of runs for each sample of the
defective component set for MG with S = 2 (circles), and S = 1 (squares), S = 2
with removal (stars) and S = 1 with removal (full squares). Left panel: N = 20,
averages over 1000 samples; right panel: N = 50, average over 200 samples.
far from optimality. This illustrates how hard this optimization problem
is. Much better results can be obtained by removing a group of 2, or 3
components, ad libitum, but of course, this needs much more computing
resources (O(N2), O(N3), . . . ), and eventually amounts to enumerating all
possibilities.
Here is the second trick that keeps the complexity with the O(N) regime.
As mentioned, the final state depends on the initial conditions, and is often
not optimal or not even near optimal. But it is still a local minimum of h2.
Therefore the idea is to do T runs with the same set of defective devices,
changing the initial condition Ui(t = 0), and to select the best run. It is a
kind of simulated annealing [36] with zero temperature, or partial enumera-
tion where repetition would be allowed. Interestingly, Figure 5 reports that
the decay is apparently a power-law first, and then begins to saturate. For
S = 1, the exponent is about −0.5, and 0.4 for S = 2; it depends weakly on
N . Remarkably, the error decreases faster with S = 1 agents than S = 2.
Note that the optimal value is at about 10−6, hence, agents are far from it.
This is due to the fact that the agents use too many components. Neverthe-
less, the improvement brought by this methods is impressive, and increases
as N increases, but cannot keep up with the exponential decay of ǫopt:
the difference becomes more and more abysmal. The component removal
further lowers the error (same figure), and more in the S = 2 that in the
S = 1 one. This advantage is reversed for T large enough when N is larger,
as reported by the right panel Fig. 5).
The other optimization problem recycles binary components [35]: one
has a set of N partially defective processors, each of them able to perform
15
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FIGURE 6. Fraction of samples for which a perfectly working subset of compo-
nents can be found. f = 0.2, average over 1000 runs.
P different operations. The manufacturing process is supposed to be fault
with probability f for each operation of each component. Mathematically,
the operation µ of processor a is permanently defective (aµ = −1) with
probability f and works permanently with probability 1− f (aµ = 1). The
probability that a component is working becomes vanishingly small when
P grows at fixed f . The task consists in finding a subset such that the
majority of its components gives the right answer, that is,
N∑
i=1
nia
µ
i > 0 for all µ = 1, · · · , P (22)
Surprisingly, the fraction φ of samples in which a perfectly working subset
of components can be found increases very quickly as N grows at fixed
P and f [35] (see also fig. 6). Finding a subset that perfectly works is
an easy problem when it is possible, but finding the one which has the
least components is a hard problem [35]. By contrast with the minimiza-
tion of fluctuations, here one wishes to maximize A given µ, that is, the
predictability H . Since all the agents eventually use only one strategy in
majority games [21], H = σ2, hence, the fluctuations σ2 are also maxi-
mized: naive agents are also sophisticated in this case. A simple majority
game does not favor any particular sign of Aµ a priori. However, if f ≪ 1/2
the sign +, hence mostly working combinations, are favored. In practice,
a majority game payoff increase is ag(A) instead of −ag(A) as in minority
games, which means that here one has
Ui(t+ 1) = Ui(t) + a
µ(t)
i A(t) (23)
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Majority games with S = 1 turn out to be better than those agents with
S = 2, as shown in Fig. 6, where the results of enumeration are also dis-
played. As the problem to find a working subset is easy for N large enough,
the agents are successful.
4 Conclusions
The efficiency of Minority Games seems to be universal with respect to
agents’ learning rate: if the latter is too high, anomalous fluctuations, hence
small efficiency arise. However, these are totally suppressed if the agents are
sophisticated, who can optimally coordinate if there is no public informa-
tion. An unexplored issue is what happens with neural networks taking into
account their impact on the game. Based on this ‘universality’, it would be
tempting to study neural networks with the sophisticated payoff.
The study of forward/reverse problems showed the limitations of agent-
based optimization in hard cases, which leaves the interesting open question
of how to improve the overall performance, and how the setup of agent-
based models can and must be tuned for individual cases.
I am grateful to J.-P. Garrahan, N. F. Johnson, M. Marsili, D. Sher-
rington and Yi-Cheng Zhang for numerous discussions. This work has been
supported by EPSRC.
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